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CURRENT CASES
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT OF COMPUTER PRO-
GRAMS: PRELIMINARY RELIEF GRANTED AGAINST
AN ALLEGED INFRINGER, USING THE ITERATIVE TEST
FOR SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY. E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden
Corporation of America, 623 F. Supp. 1485 (D. Minn. 1985).
The District Court for the District of Minnesota issued a pre-
liminary injunction against an alleged infringer of a copyrighted
computer program for a logic trunked radio system developed for
mobile radios. In granting this preliminary relief, the court sur-
veyed the state of the law in the area, identified the proper tests to
be applied, and concluded that the requested relief was appropriate
even though the microcodes for the two programs were written in
different assembly language for different types of microprocessors.
The court found especially significant the presence of precisely the
same superfluous instructions and precisely the same errors con-
tained within the two programs.
Plaintiff E.F. Johnson Co. (EFJ) is a Minnesota corporation
engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling two-way land-
based communications systems. After three years of research and
development, EFJ introduced its logic trunked radio system (LTR)1
into the marketplace in 1980, and has periodically improved and
modified the system since that time. The "heart" of the LTR is the
computer software contained both in the mobile radios and the re-
peaters.2 The copyrighted software in EFJ's radios is mounted on a
Copyright © 1986 John S. Wesolowski. All Rights Reserved.
1. The LTR system developed by EFJ utilizes a "trunking" or pooling of frequency
channels, permitting the system to afford all system users automatic access to all channels for
maximum efficiency. Rather than assign each user a discrete channel, the trunked system,
through the use of sophisticated computer software, patches together unutilized airwave
"spaces" to create an uninterrupted channel of communication. The net result is that the
system can accommodate more users than it has frequency channels available. 623 F. Supp.
1485, 1489 (D. Minn. 1985).
2. The EFJ system is composed of two elements: (1) repeaters, which control access to
the system and receive and retransmit signals from mobile radio units; and (2) mobile radio
and control units. The system works as follows: Each mobile radio is assigned to a repeater.
Repeaters are analogous to radio station transmitters. The mobile radios send signals - high
speed digital data bursts at sub-audible frequencies - to the repeater, which identifies the
sending unit and which retransmits and amplifies the signal so that it can be received by the
appropriate mobile unit. 623 F. Supp. at 1489.
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Read Only Memory (ROM) microchip and is processed by an Intel
microprocessor. At the time of this action, EFJ commanded a sig-
nificant position in the national market for LTR systems, despite
competing with much larger companies such as General Electric
and Motorola.3
In April of 1985, Defendant Uniden Corporation of America
(Uniden)4 introduced a mobile radio which was compatible with
EFJ's system. In order to develop its radio and software program,
Uniden had disassembled5 the EFJ software and had studied the
program flow charts, as well as EFJ's hardware and service manu-
als. The software developed by Uniden was stored on an Erasable
Program Read Only Memory (EPROM) microchip, and was
processed by a Hitachi microprocessor. Uniden's mobile radio was
distributed in the United States and retailed at 31-39% less than the
EFJ mobile radio.
EFJ's engineers analyzed the Uniden radio and found it to be
compatible with its LTR repeaters. They then analyzed the
software used by Uniden by "dumping" the machine code and
"uploading" it into a computer to make a comparison with the
copyrighted EFJ program. The EFJ engineers were convinced that
the two programs were identical, and that Uniden had copied the
EFJ software.6 EFJ then filed suit for copyright infringement7 and
a violation of the Minnesota Uniform Trade Secrets Act8 and
moved for a preliminary injunction on the copyright infringement
count.9
The district court set out the controlling test for the Eighth
Circuit to determine whether preliminary injunctive relief is appro-
priate.10 Four factors are to be considered: (1) the threat of irrepa-
rable harm to the movant; (2) a balancing of the respective harms
among the litigants; (3) the probability that the movant will succeed
3. 623 F. Supp. at 1489-90. EFJ's annual sales volume of trunked radios is approxi-
mately $25 million factory net, $40 million retail. Approximately 30 percent of EFJ's total
sales are of mobile trunked radios. The national retail market for mobile trunked radios is on
the order of $200 - $250 million per year.
4. Uniden Corporation of America is an Indiana corporation and a subsidiary of
Uniden Corporation of Japan. Uniden imports and distributes electronic equipment includ-
ing land-based communications systems. 623 F. Supp. at 1487.
5. 623 F. Supp. at 1490. Disassembly of a computer program is accomplished by
translating the machine or object code into humanly readable assembly language.
6. Id.
7. 17 U.S.C. § 501 et seq. (1978).
8. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325 C.01-.07 (West 1981).
9. 623 F. Supp. at 1491.
10. 623 F. Supp. at 1490, citing Dataphase Systems, Inc. v. CL Systems, Inc., 640 F.2d
109 (8th Cir. 1981).
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on the merits; and (4) the public interest.1 The court recognized
that of the four factors, the probability of success on the merits is
the predominant factor in a copyright infringement case,1 2 and
thereafter devoted the majority of the decision to this area.
In order to satisfy this predominant factor and thereby estab-
lish its likelihood of success on the merits, EFJ needed to prove: (1)
ownership of the copyright, and (2) copying, or infringement of the
copyrighted work by the defendant. 3 The court found that EFJ
had demonstrated that the copyright was registered in EFJ's name,
and therefore presumptively valid, thus satisfying the ownership re-
quirement. 4 Additionally, the court found that adequate notice of
the copyright was included in every EFJ radio. The court then
stated that since direct evidence of copying is often unavailable,
copying can be inferred where it is proved that the defendant had
"access" to the copyrighted work, and that the accused work is
"substantially similar" to the copyrighted work.'5
"Access" was easily found, since Uniden had admitted remov-
ing and analyzing the EFJ program. 6
Judge MacLaughlin then examined the critical "substantial
similarity" element, and noted that the traditional "ordinary ob-
server" test' 7 has proven problematical in computer software in-
fringement cases because the copyrighted material is stored on a
computer chip or disc and is well-hidden from public view.'" He
then identified a more contemporary test for use in establishing sub-
stantial similarity in a computer software context, the "iterative"
test.' 9 The iterative approach requires proof (1) that the defendant
"used" the copyrighted work in preparing the alleged copy, which
may be established by proof of access and similarity sufficient to
reasonably infer use of the copyrighted work; and (2) that the de-
fendant's work is an iterative or exact duplication of substantial
11. 623 F. Supp. at 1490-91.
12. Id. at 1491, citing 3 NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 14.06[A] n.6.1 ("in most
cases it is the third, reasonable likelihood of success, factor which is determinative").
13. 623 F. Supp. at 1491-92.
14. Id. at 1492.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. The substantial similarity test has been stated as "whether the work is recogniz-
able by an ordinary observer as having been taken from the copyrighted source," citing Wihtol
v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777, 780 (8th Cir. 1962). (Emphasis added).
18. 623 F. Supp. at 1493.
19. Id. This "iterative" test is extensively discussed in Note, Copyright Infringement of
Computer Programs: A Modification of the Substantial Similarity Test, 68 MINN. L. REv.
1264, 1294-1300 (1984), which is cited with approval in the instant opinion.
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portions of the copyrighted work. Under the "iterative" approach,
the fact finder's focus shifts from the ordinary observer's "total con-
cept and feel" of the two works to an analysis of the "quantitative
and qualitative evidence of the similarities" as gauged by the court's
evaluation of expert testimony.20 The court concluded that under
either the traditional "ordinary observer" test or the more contem-
porary "iterative" test, Uniden's program was substantially similar
to EFJ's copyrighted program.2
In analyzing the indicia of similarity between the programs,
the district court recognized that certain aspects of the design were
required to be the same, such as the "Barker code".22 Yet in de-
signing its sampling method for comparing incoming data, Uniden
used precisely the same sampling rate as did EFJ, when the Hitachi
microprocessor utilized by Uniden was capable of a much higher
and therefore more efficient sampling rate than the Intel
microprocessor used by EFJ. Additionally, the sample error table
and the error threshold used to determine synchronization in
Uniden's program were identical to those found in the EFJ pro-
gram, when more logical and efficient methods were available to the
Uniden engineers.2 3
Other point-by-point similarities were identified in the opin-
ion24, including an identical H-Matrix25, and the presence in both
programs of an identical inverse H-Matrix which was included in
the EFJ program by mistake. Another striking similarity was the
20. 623 F. Supp. at 1493.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1493-94. A "Barker code" is a pattern of ones and zeros alternated in a
prepatterned sequence, and both the sending and receiving units must identify the Barker
code to establish communication. In order to make its radios compatible, Uniden was re-
quired to and did copy this aspect of the EFJ program.
The program within the system then compares incoming streams of data with the Barker
word to determine whether the transmission is in fact the proper Barker word. This is done
by way of a matching and synchronization system known as the shifting correlation scheme
for detection.
23. 623 F. Supp. at 1494-95.
24. Id. at 1495-97. In addition to those similarities mentioned in the text accompany-
ing notes 25 and 26, infra, the similarities and evidences of copying identified by the court
included: (1) both programs contained an error in the "select call prohibit" feature, which
caused transmission to be blocked to all dispatchers aligned with a particular repeater, in-
stead of blocking only transmissions to the dispatcher who is transmitting to another user
(this error was subsequently corrected in later versions of the EFJ code); (2) both programs
contained an unnecessary line of code, a "counter," set arbitrarily by EFJ at 20 code cycles;
(3) 38 of 44 subroutines found in the two codes were identical; and (4) large segments of
Uniden's manual prepared for use with its radios were lifted verbatim from an EFJ manual.
25. An H-Matrix is used in the LTR system to detect errors in transmission, once com-
munication has been established by matching of Barker codes. This H-Matrix can be con-
figured in any of 32 different ways. 623 F. Supp. at 1495.
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presence of three superfluous and completely unnecessary instruc-
tions, which were inadvertently left in the EFJ code. These same
superfluous instructions were present in the Uniden program, and
the court stated that the existence of identical unnecessary instruc-
tions in both codes is strong proof of substantial similarity.z6
Uniden argued that a line-by-line comparison of the EFJ and
Uniden codes, translated into Hitachi language, demonstrated that
the two codes were dissimilar. The court found this argument un-
convincing, stating that a literal translation of EFJ's Intel instruc-
tions into Hitachi's language necessarily involved a skewing of the
program which made a line-by-line comparison meaningless.
2 7
Other defenses asserted by Uniden were based on the premise that
the EFJ software was not copyrightable. These claims were simi-
larly rejected by Judge MacLaughlin.28
After the court's determination that EFJ had successfully
demonstrated the predominant factor of probability of success on
the merits, Judge MacLaughlin easily found the remaining three
factors necessary for a preliminary injunction: (1) irreparable in-
jury is generally presumed in copyright infringement cases for the
purposes of a preliminary injunction motion once the moving party
has established a case of copyright infringement, and even if there
were no such presumption, EFJ had established that continuing in-
fringement of EFJ's copyrighted program would jeopardize its com-
petitive position in the marketplace;29 (2) the balance of harms
favored EFJ, in that the only harm which Uniden would suffer
would be the lost profits on its infringing radios, which the court
characterized as "not a weighty equitable consideration";30 and (3)
the public interest would be served by the preliminary injunction in
order to promote the goals of the copyright laws - "to encourage
26. 623 F. Supp. at 1496. The court cited a comparable district court opinion in which
"totally functionless" instructions appeared in both the copyrighted and infringing codes:
"[t]he only conceivable explanation is that [the defendant] copied this non-functional feature
from the [plaintiff's] source code." SAS Inst., Inc. v. S & H Computer Sys., Inc., 605 F.
Supp. 816, 824 (M.D. Tenn. 1985).
27. 623 F. Supp. at 1497.
28. Id. at 1498-1503. Uniden raised three defenses which were discussed by the court
and ultimately rejected as being without merit. These defenses were: (1) that EFJ had not
contributed a "literary work" and that therefore the program was not copyrightable; (2) that
the EFJ program was not copyrightable because it was derived in large part from pre-existing
work in the public domain; and (3) that the very nature of the EFJ idea or program limited
the number of ways that this idea could be expressed, and that when the idea thus constrains
possible methods of its expressions, the idea and expression merge so that any attempted
copyright of the merged expression is void ab initio.
29. 623 F. Supp. at 1503.
30. Id. at 1503-04.
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individual effort and creativity by granting valuable enforceable
rights."31 The court then issued the injunction, ordering that
Uniden and all those acting in concert with Uniden were enjoined
and restrained from all marketing, selling or other comparable ac-
tivities with respect to its LTR-compatible radio programs. Uniden
was also ordered to notify all relevant persons, including its employ-
ees, attorneys, and those in active concert or participation with
Uniden of the terms of the injunction and their duty to abide by it.3 2
E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corporation of America offers an
excellent guide to practitioners in the computer field as to the evi-
dentiary facts which must be demonstrated in order to secure pre-
liminary relief in a computer software copyright infringement
matter. E.. Johnson provides a logical blueprint for use in copy-
right infringement litigation, and should serve as persuasive prece-
dent. The courts and the attorneys who practice in computer law
realize that the subject area is quite technical and complex, and pre-
liminary relief is generally denied because of this complexity and
the use of conflicting expert testimony.
Now, however, preliminary relief is clearly available to a plain-
tiff who is able to demonstrate in a quantitative and qualitative
manner that his copyrighted software is substantially similar to that
of the alleged infringer, as well as prove the remaining requirements
for such relief. From a purely economic point of view, the advan-
tage of procuring this relief cannot be overemphasized. An infring-
ing competitor can severely undercut and dilute the plaintiff's
market, resulting in potentially disastrous effects upon the business
of a plaintiff protected by copyright. Of course, this is not meant to
indicate that healthy competition is to be discouraged, but only that
wrongful, infringing competition is disfavored. As a result of a pre-
liminary injunction, a plaintiff such as EFJ is better able to hold its
position in the marketplace. In EFJ's case, the Uniden software was
introduced in April of 1985; the complaint was filed in June; the
hearing was held in September, and the injunction was ordered in
December. Thus, only eight months passed from the introduction
of the Uniden radio to the injunction, a much more satisfactory re-
sult for a plaintiff than having to wait for a full-blown trial on the
merits.
A plaintiff must be well prepared, however, and present his evi-
dence clearly and persuasively in a "mini-trial" setting. E.F John-
son shows some of the technical hoops that must be jumped through
31. Id. at 1504.
32. Id. at 1505.
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in order to successfully convince the judge hearing the motion that
the defendant did indeed copy the plaintiff's copyrighted program,
and that preliminary relief should be granted. E.. Johnson indi-
cates that the court will consider superfluous and unnecessary in-
structions and errors in a program to be of significant value in
proving copying or infringement. Counsel for software companies
would be wise to instruct their clients to include these types of
harmless "fingerprints" or clues in the copyrighted software, as they
are an invaluable aid in an infringement action.
It is unclear whether the district court has adopted the "itera-
tive" test for substantial similarity in computer software cases, since
it rested its finding of substantial similarity on both the iterative test
and the ordinary observer test. Nevertheless, the court has clearly
approved the iterative approach in a computer software context,
both by its extended discussion of the test and by its actual use of
the iterative test in the point-by-point comparison of the two pro-
grams. The use of this iterative test in such circumstances is a step
forward that other courts should make, because of the inherent diffi-
culties in applying the ordinary observer test to a tiny computer
chip. The iterative test's emphasis on exact duplication of substan-
tial portions of the copyrighted work make the point-by-point anal-
ysis of the two programs especially revealing and practicable.
John S. Wesolowski
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CONTRACTS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE-VALIDITY OF
EMPLOYEE COVENANT- TERMINATION CONTRACT
RESTRAINING FORMER EMPLOYEE FROM INTERFER-
ING WITH EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS BY "RAIDING" ITS
EMPLOYEES IS ENFORCEABLE. Loral Corporation v. Moyes,
174 Cal. App. 3d 268, 219 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1985).
When an employee makes the decision to leave his employer to
join a competitor or to start a competing enterprise, the possibility
exists that the employee will engage in employee raiding. Because
the problem of employee raiding can result in considerable damage
to a business, employers and their counsel have questioned whether
there are measures available by which to alleviate this danger.
In Loral Corporation v. Moyes,1 a case of first impression, a
California court of appeal has answered the question in the affirma-
tive, holding a termination contract that prohibited an executive
from "raiding" his former employees after he had resigned was not
an illegal restraint of trade and was enforceable.2
Defendant Robert Moyes served as the president of the Ter-
raCom Division of Conic Corporation (Conic), a wholly owned sub-
sidiary of Loral Corporation (Loral), for several years prior to 1979.
TerraCom was an electronics manufacturer which sought to de-
velop a commercial digital microwave radio. Moyes also served as
a member of Conic's Board of Directors. On March 29, 1979,
Moyes and directors of Loral and Conic signed a handwritten
agreement terminating Moyes' employment,3 and on May 4, 1979,
Moyes signed a more formal agreement.4 The agreement contained
provisions resolving salary, fringe benefits and stock obligations
owed to Moyes, as well as an agreement by Moyes that he would
"preserve the confidentiality of all trade secrets and other confiden-
tial information" and that he would not:
now or in the future disrupt, damage, impair, or interfere with
the business of Conic Corporation, or its TerraCom Division
whether by way of interfering with or raiding its employees, dis-
Copyright © 1986 Elizabeth A. Harris. All Rights Reserved.
1. 174 Cal. App. 3d 268, 219 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1985).
2. California provides by statute that any contract in restraint of trade is invalid. CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1964). See also infra note 18.
3. The court found it unnecessary to elaborate on the reasons for Moyes' termination
since it determined this information did not relate to the validity of the trial court's judgment
of nonsuit on the complaint.
4. 174 Cal. App. 3d at 273, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
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rupting its relationships with customers, agents, representatives
or vendors or otherwise. You are not however, restricted from
being employed by or engaged in a competing business.
5
Moyes subsequently became employed by Aydin Corporation
(Aydin) as president of its newly formed microwave division.6
Thereafter, Moyes offered employment with Aydin to two key Ter-
raCom employees, the first immediately after Moyes' departure and
while the employee was still employed by TerraCom, and the sec-
ond within several months of Moyes' departure and within a week
of the employee's departure from TerraCom. Both employees ac-
cepted the offers of employment and went to work for Aydin. Fur-
ther, a TerraCom investigation revealed that a large number of its
key employees had interviewed with Moyes and had been offered
jobs with Aydin.7
Loral and Conic' filed suit against Moyes alleging, among
other things, that Moyes breached the termination agreement by
inducing its employees to work for Aydin.9
The trial court granted Moyes' motion for judgment of nonsuit
after plaintiffs' opening statement ° on the ground the restriction
against "raiding" Conic's employees was an unlawful restraint of
competition, stating "the contract in its entirety is null and void ab
initio."11 The court of appeal reversed tle judgment of nonsuit and
remanded the matter for trial. 2
The court of appeal found unpersuasive defendant's contention
5. Id. at 274, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Hereafter, Loral and Conic will collectively be referred to as "plaintiffs".
9. Plaintiffs' complaint also set forth a cause of action for misuse of trade secrets in
which plaintiffs alleged the abilities and salaries of their employees constituted trade secrets.
174 Cal. App. 3d at 280, n.6, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 844, n.6. In addition, Moyes filed a cross-
complaint apparently alleging the termination agreement was induced by fraud. Id. at 271,
219 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
10. A nonsuit will be granted after the plaintiff's opening statement when it is clear the
facts if proved will not constitute a cause of action. CAL. CODE OF CIV. PROC. § 581c (west
1986).
11. The trial court also entered judgment on the cross-complaint determining the termi-
nation agreement had not been induced by fraud, and granting restitution to Moyes of certain
shares of stock as described in the termination agreement. 174 Cal. App. 3d at 280, 219 Cal.
Rptr. at 845.
12. 174 Cal. App. 3d at 271, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 838. As a consequence of the court's
reversal of the nonsuit, the court of appeal also vacated the trial court judgment on the cross-
complaint insofar as Moyes was granted restitution, but otherwise affirmed the judgment on
the cross-complaint. Id. at 280-81, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 845. It was unnecessary for the court to
address plaintiffs' cause of action for misuse of trade secrets since plaintiffs dismissed this
cause of action. Id.
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that the contract was void since under the law of unfair competition
there is nothing generally illegal about soliciting a competitor's em-
ployees not under contract, and that a contract prohibiting the same
is thus invalid. Defendant relied on Hollingsworth Solderless Termi-
nal Co. v. Turley,1 3 in which a federal court of appeals, applying
California law, stated that an employer may not prohibit by con-
tract conduct not subject to judicial restraint under the law of un-
fair competition.14
The court of appeal rejected defendant's proposition, noting
that to the extent cases have found solicitation of a competitor's
employees not to be actionable, none have involved an agreement
not to interfere with former coworkers.15 Moreover, the court
found Hollingsworth inapposite, explaining there was no noninter-
ference agreement in the case nor was the court's ruling concerning
the new employer's interference with employees concerned with
California Business and Professions Code section 16600.16 Rather,
the court in Hollingsworth applied section 16600 to a former em-
ployee's promises of nondisclosure and nonsolicitation as the Cali-
fornia state courts have done.17
Defendant's major contention in support of the trial court
judgment was that the termination contract was void under Busi-
ness and Professions Code section 16600.18 Because no California
court had previously applied section 16600 to a noninterference
agreement, the court initially looked to the law of unfair competi-
tion for guidance which, absent the termination contract, would
have regulated Moyes' conduct.19
The court observed that the law of unfair competition prohibits
former employees from disclosing an employer's trade secrets and
confidential information even in the absence of a contract.20 Em-
ployers may validly supplement the law of the marketplace by en-
tering into nondisclosure and nonsolicitation agreements with their
13. 622 F.2d 1324, 1338 (9th Cir. 1980).
14. 174 Cal. App. 3d at 277, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 842.
15. Id. Rather, the cases upon which defendant relied concerned the existence of tort
liability under the law of unfair competition. 174 Cal. App. 3d at 276-77, 219 Cal. Rptr. at
841-42.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 278, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 842-43.
18. Section 16600 provides that "every contract by which anyone is restrained from
engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent void." CAL.
BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1964).
19. 174 Cal. App. 3d at 275, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
20. Id.
19861
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employees.21 Restrictions placed on an employee in a nondisclosure
agreement, however, are enforceable only to the extent a judicial
determination of the existence of a trade secret is made.22 In con-
trast, when permissible solicitation of an employer's customers is at
issue, a contract may prohibit more than the law of unfair competi-
tion otherwise would.23 Thus, the court concluded, contractual re-
strictions may have more impact in a nonsolicitation case than in a
nondisclosure case.24
In further considering defendant's contention the contract was
invalid under section 16600, the Loral court next reviewed estab-
lished case law as to the impact of the statute on similar contractual
restrictions. The court first observed that contracts prohibiting a
former employee from obtaining new employment with a competi-
tor are invalid under section 16600.25 Reasonably limited restric-
tions that tend to promote rather than to restrain trade and
business, however, have been upheld.26 For example, section 16600
does not invalidate an employee's agreement not to disclose his for-
mer employer's confidential customer lists or other trade secrets, or
not to solicit those customers.27 Thus, the court summarized, while
agreements which penalize a former employee for obtaining em-
ployment with a competitor are clearly invalid in California, agree-
ments which seek merely to delimit how a former employee can
compete are not necessarily invalid.28
Consequently, the determinative question for the court was
"whether a noninterference agreement not to solicit former co-
workers to leave the employer is more like a noncompetition agree-
ment which is invalid, or a nondisclosure or nonsolicitation agree-
ment which may be valid." 29
The court answered its question by looking to two Georgia
cases which upheld noninterference promises as not in restraint of
trade.
In Lane v. Taylor,30 an employer sued its former employee for
breach of an employment agreement that prohibited her from hiring
21. Id. at 276, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
22. Id. at 275, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. 174 Cal. App. 3d at 275-76, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
26. 174 Cal. App. 3d at 276, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. 174 Ga. App. 356, 330 S.E.2d 112 (1985).
[Vol. 2
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employees or otherwise causing them to work for another employer
for a period of one year after her termination.3" In reversing a sum-
mary judgment for the former employee, the Georgia court con-
cluded the limited restriction on "pirating" of employees was
reasonable32 and needed to protect legitimate business interests.33
The Loral court also reviewed Harrison v. Sarah Coventry,
Inc., which had been cited by the Lane court. In Harrison, an
employer sued former employees for violating an employment con-
tract by which they agreed that during employment and for two
years post-termination they would not disclose the identity of the
employer's customers nor attempt to induce them to leave the com-
pany.35 The Harrison court distinguished cases involving noncom-
petition agreements without territorial limitations, and concluded
there was no restraint of trade because the former employees were
free to work for a competitor as long as they did not interfere with
their former employer's contractual relationships or divulge the
names of former co-workers.
36
The Loral court, thus, adopted the reasoning of the Georgia
courts, holding that "the potential impact on trade must be consid-
ered before invalidating anoninterference agreement.
37
In the instant case, Moyes was restrained from "disrupting,
damaging, impairing or interfering with" Conic's business by raid-
ing its employees. 38 The court found such a restriction no more of a
31. The agreement also provided that defendant Taylor would neither solicit her former
employer's customers nor disclose confidential information. 174 Cal. App. 3d at 278, 219
Cal. Rptr. at 843.
32. Id. The Loral court characterized the noninterference provision in Lane as "rea-
sonable" based on the fact it was limited to one year in duration and restricted only the
actions of the defendant former employee.
33. Id. The court in Lane also held the provision of the employment agreement barring
solicitation of customers void because it was not limited in area. Id.
34. 228 Ga. 169, 184 S.E.2d 448 (1971).
35. 174 Cal. App. 3d at 278, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 843.
36. Id.
37. Id. In relying on the Georgia cases, the court apparently found of no significance
the fact that in those cases the courts were concerned with the validity of restrictive cove-
nants in employment contracts, whereas the instant case derived from an alleged breach of a
termination contract entered into several years beyond Moyes' initial employment with Conic
and simultaneous with his termination. While the Loral contract carefully provided signifi-
cant consideration for Moyes' agreement not to interfere with Conic's business, the equality
of bargaining power as between the parties in such a situation is clearly distinguishable from
that which existed in the Georgia cases, particularly in view of Moyes' cross-complaint alle-
gation that the agreement was induced by fraud. Even had the court discussed the issue,
however, it is doubtful such consideration would have impacted on the outcome of the case
since, ultimately, the agreement did not place Moyes in the position of giving up his ability to
compete with Conic.
38. 174 Cal. App. 3d at 279, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 843.
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significant restraint on Moyes engaging in his profession than would
be a restraint on solicitation of customers or on the disclosure of
confidential information.39 In fact, the court emphasized, the "May
4th agreement expressly permits Moyes to be employed by or en-
gage in a competing business."''
Defendant Moyes attempted to distinguish the Georgia cases
on the ground they involved noninterference agreements of limited
duration whereas the instant agreement was of unlimited duration,
a restriction defendant argued was more onerous and more likely to
restrain trade.41
The court rejected defendant's argument, however, finding that
duration alone of a restrictive agreement is not determinative of its
enforceability.42 Rather, the court concluded, enforceability de-
pends upon a covenant's reasonableness, evaluated in terms of the
employer, the employee, and the public.43
Applying its test of reasonableness, the court upheld the termi-
nation contract, concluding the noninterference restriction had no
overall negative impact on trade or business. 4" The court posited
plaintiffs' purpose in imposing the noninterference restriction on
Moyes was to enable Conic to maintain a stable work force and to
remain in business.4 5 Thus, the court determined the restriction im-
pacted on Moyes' business practices in a small way in order to pro-
mote Conic's business.46 Further, the court found, contrary to
Moyes' contention, the restriction only slightly affected Conic's re-
maining employees inasmuch as they were not prevented from seek-
ing employment with Aydin nor from contacting Moyes, but lost
only the option of being contacted by Moyes.47
Nonetheless, the court strictly limited its holding to the facts of
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. The court also observed that the California Legislature has allowed business
sellers to promise noncompetition to their buyers without time limitation other than for the
period "so long as the buyer, or any person deriving title to the goodwill or shares from him,
carries on a like business therein." CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16601 (West 1964). Courts
faced with noncompetition contracts without this limitation have upheld the contracts by
reading the statutory limitation into them. Id.
44. 174 Cal. App. 3d. at 280, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. As the court observed, equity will not enjoin a former employee from receiving and
considering applications from employees of his former employer even though the circum-
stances be such that he should be enjoined from soliciting their applications. Id., citing Aetna
Bldg. Maintenance Co. v. West, 39 Cal. 2d 198, 204 (1952).
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the instant case, determining only that the noninterference contract
was not void under section 16600 when applied to Moyes' conduct
in violating the contract within one year of its execution.4" The
court expressly declined to determine whether the noninterference
agreement, unlimited in duration, would unreasonably and illegally
restrain trade if applied to "other conduct at another time."'4 9
A broad reading of section 16600 suggests an employer cannot
require an employee to agree to limit his ability to compete in any
way. Nonetheless, the court in Loral held that section 16600 did
not obtain in the context of a noninterference agreement because
the contract specifically provided Moyes was free to compete.
Thus, the court distinguished between allowing Moyes personally to
go out and work for a competitor, and allowing him to disrupt
Conic's business by raiding other key employees.
The problem of employee raiding is of critical importance to
employers. The activity can be costly to an employer in terms of
recruiting and training replacement employees and in the adverse
impact significant employee losses may have on an employer's per-
formance. Of more concern, however, employee raiding carries
with it the danger that departing employees or their new employers
will appropriate valuable trade secrets and confidential information
for their own benefit.
Ultimately, an employer may best protect against the loss of
valued employees by paying them well, showing appreciation for
their work, and rewarding innovation. Even in the best work envi-
ronment, however, it will be inevitable that employees will move on.
Thus, in order to prevent employee raiding by former employees, an
employer may be wise to utilize a specific noninterference agree-
ment in its employment and termination contracts. As the narrow
holding in Loral suggests, however, whether a particular contract
will in fact stand up in court will depend on the facts of each case.
Elizabeth A. Harris
48. 174 Cal. App. 3d at 274, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
49. 174 Cal. App. 3d at 279,219 Cal. Rptr. at 844. The court also rejected defendant's
contention that plaintiffs' action was subject to nonsuit because the complaint failed to allege
full performance on their part of the contract. The court found plaintiffs' obligations were
conditioned upon Moyes' observation of his own promises, which Moyes almost immediately
violated. Thus, plaintiffs' performance was excused by Moyes' breach of the termination con-
tract. Although this was not stated in plaintiffs' complaint, it was implied by plaintiffs' open-
ing statement. Id. at 280, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
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